Introduction
Poland acceded to the EU in May 2004, along with seven other post-communist nations (commonly called the EU-8) 1 , as well as Cyprus and Malta 2 . Unlike the previous four enlargements this was the first to address the issue of Europe's reunification and followed the fall of the Soviet rule over Eastern Europe.
However, Poland's integration into the EU economy was a gradual and lengthy process which had formally been initiated in December 16, 1991 when Poland and the EU signed the Europe Agreement. In 1993 the European Council made an official invitation for Poland and a number of other CEE countries to apply for membership and set out the so-called Copenhagen criteria, pre-requisites that needed to be met before membership could be and was followed by a referendum, which was held on June 7-8. The results of the referendum as well as the turnout were issues of concern for the Polish president, the government and the people who were engaged in the accession process. After the initial enthusiasm of Polish citizens for EU membership, in the years preceding the enlargement public support decreased 6 , which has been explained by fatigue with systemic reforms and 1 EU-8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 2 EU-8 and Cyprus and Malta are jointly named as the EU-10. Later in the text they will be also called NMS which stands for New Member States. 3 Old Member States (OMS) or EU-15 -this term stands for 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 4 In the case of EU-15 on the grounds that the rapid integration may pose particular risks (see section 3 b on migrations of labor). 5 By March 2006 this rate increased to 99% (European Commission 2006a, p. 17) . 6 In June 1994 when the first representative survey has been made, 77% of adults were in favor of the integration while only 6 % were against it (CBOS 2006b The transposition of the acquis to the national legislation was considered not only onerous but also expensive for the acceding countries, especially in two areas: environment and transport. In order to cope with the adjustment costs, the European Council decided that the EU should contribute financially through pre-accession aid This paper aims to briefly discuss the main economic developments in Poland since its accession to the EU in May 2004 and see how they relate to the regulatory environment and policies which the EU imposes on the member states. The paper starts with a brief description of principles, legislation and policies adopted in the EU (Section 1), which influence the decisions made by the government, as well as entrepreneurs, investors, companies and workers. Section 2 discusses outcomes that were anticipated to occur as a references to developments that took place in Poland in the pre-accession period. This is because, as discussed above, the integration process began several years before the formal accession.
What does EU Accession Mean
EU membership implies the adoption of common policies and legislation by the acceding and member countries. The EU policies and legislation with regard to economic issues are built on the following principles:
1. The principle of the Single Market, which embraces four freedoms:
• free movement of goods
• free movement of services
• free movement of capital
• free movement of labor 2. Fiscal discipline of the member countries 3. Protection of competition and consumers' rights 4. Limits to state aid in the member countries 5. Entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 6. Adoption of common financial mechanisms to support specified common goals.
7. Adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which protects agriculture from internal and external competition.
Free movement of goods is an old principle in use in the European Union. The Customs Union was introduced in July 1968 by the then European Community, which at that time consisted of six countries. As of January 1 st 1993, the Single Market was created. The following year the Community Customs Code was introduced.
The advancement of the second principle i.e. free movement of services has been varied. Following the adoption of the EU laws in this area, now there is a need to implement and properly enforce the new regulations. The European Union (the EU-15) has elaborated common financial mechanisms whose objective is to support specified common goals. As of the 2004 enlargement, these mechanisms also apply to the New Member States. The funding comes from the EU budget, which is raised through the contributions of all member states according to the same rule 14 .
13 Total state aid less railways. If agriculture and fisheries are also disregarded, the data for state aid was 0.44% and 0.4% respectively) (European Commission, 2006b ). 14 The payments from the member countries account for 72% of the EU budget revenues in 2006. The remaining 28% comes from the EU's own resources. They are: agricultural duties and sugar levies; customs duties; VAT revenues from a uniform percent rate applied on all EU countries (14%).
The three consecutive budgets of the enlarged EU (for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006) amounted to EUR 100, 106 and 112 billion respectively and this constituted approximately 1% of the Gross National Income (GNI) of the EU-25 (European Commission, 2006d).
A negative correlation exists between a member country's income (measured by GDP per capita) and the amount of its net transfers to the EU budget. Since all NMS have a GDP per capita below the GDP per capita for the enlarged Europe (EU-25), all ten are net recipients of the EU budget. Another important rule binding the Member Countries is that the EU transfers to recipient member countries require national co-financing (up to 15-25%). The co-financing rule is seen as a way to foster the efficient use of the money.
The structure of budgetary expenditures is as follows. The largest portion of the EU funds The EU also funds internal policies (nuclear safety, institution building and border control in the Schengen framework) and external actions; however these two items are relatively small when compared with the first two.
Expected Outcomes of EU Accession
The democratic, economic and institutional reforms undertaken prior to accession and required by the EU-15 as a precondition of EU membership have resulted in the creation of market economies in the eight CEE countries. The adoption of market mechanisms brought about an increase in efficiency and a restructuring of the real sector.
In political terms, EU membership was expected to create an environment of stability, security and prosperity that would encourage foreign investment and would lead to the reallocation of production to NMS. This, in turn, was expected to contribute to economic growth (Kok, 2003) .
In economic terms, membership was expected to bring about substantial gains in the medium and long run. The adoption of the four freedoms that are at the core of the EU integration should facilitate flows of labor, capital and goods. The free movement of goods as well as the factors of production is expected to lead to increased competition on labor and capital markets, as well as goods and services markets. Increased competition should consequently lead to the lowering of costs (increased efficiency), the spatial reallocation of production, and technological and institutional innovations. Increased trade brings about intensified commercial links and co-operation.
The EU state aid rules and policies impose limitations on direct government interventions into economic activity and thus protect competition 16 . These limitations adopted in the NMS should effectively stop the common practice of transition countries' governments of getting involved in solving the crises situations of individual enterprises (Hashi and Balcerowicz, 2006 ).
In addition, EU membership exposes member countries to EU-wide economic policy coordination and imposes fiscal discipline so as to avoid excessive public debt. Empirical research results point out the negative correlation between economic growth and a high budget deficit (Fischer, 1993) . Studies have also proven that both general government deficit and inflation reduce investment and limit productivity gains.
A substantial benefit for Poland and other CEE countries of becoming EU member states is access to the structural funds raised through members' contributions and managed by the European Commission. The volume of funds is substantial (see Section 1), therefore payments received by the NMS, if reasonably and efficiently used, have the potential to contribute considerably to improvement of public infrastructure.
In addition to the arguments for EU membership presented above, which were formed by economists, policy makers, and politicians, there were also anxieties voiced by the public, 16 In the years 2000-2003, i.e. on the eve of accession, state aid in Poland accounted for 1.26% of GDP and was three times higher than the average for the EU-15 (which was 0.43%, see European Commission, 2006b). Only 24% of the state aid was used for horizontal objectives, while in the old member states it was 75%. This shows the distance that needed to be cut.
particularly trade unions, which were present in both the political debates in the member and candidate countries and also at the pan-European level. To respond to these anxieties several studies were undertaken before the enlargement to estimate the potential effects on both the EU-15 and the acceding countries.
Although economists used different methodologies and approaches, the results from their studies were consistent and suggested that notable gains would result from the enlargement:
both for the EU-15 and for the NMS
17
. The gains were expected to be greater for the acceding countries, largely due to their smaller economic size relative to the EU-15, which would make the enlargement shock more pronounced. Yet another reason raised in the analyses was that the NMS, which had a lower level of development due to only recently adopting market rules and joining the common market, should improve their performance at a faster pace than the old member states. For example one of the studies estimated that for the EU-8, the additional growth (GDP) that would result from the 2004 enlargement would be 1.3-2.1% per year, while only 0.5 -0.7% for the 15 old member nations (European Commission, 2001 ). Estimates by CASE expert (Maliszewska, 2004) were lower: the liberalization of trade and the reduction of technical barriers was forecasted to bring an increase in GDP of 3.4% in Poland in the long run, 7% in Hungary, while only 0.3% in the EU-15 .
The key concern of the old member countries was that the 2004 enlargement would cause a massive migration from the poorer new member states to the richer EU-15. They feared this would negatively impact wages (downward pressure) in the OMS, as well as the standard of living of certain segments of the labor market (deterioration). However, ex ante studies based on aggregate data did not provide conclusive evidence. While it was estimated that the wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would grow in the long run in Germany and Austria
18
, in Denmark they were expected to decrease 19 . As far as the impact on the labor markets in the new member states is concerned, it was estimated that the real wages of unskilled workers in Poland and Hungary would increase by 1.7% and 3.2% respectively, and that this growth would be greater than the growth in skilled workers' wages (Maliszewska, 2004) . 17 For the brief review see European Commission (2006) . 18 By 0.5% and 0.6% respectively, see Keuschnigg et al, 1999 and 2002. 19 By -0.81% in the years 2000-2065, see Kristensen and Jensen, 2001 .
Poland 2006: Economic Developments in two years of EU Membership
As discussed earlier, Poland's integration with the EU has been a lengthy process, and it is not yet complete. The formal accession that took place on 1 May 2004 was only a single event marking the formal change of the country's political and economic status. However, it is important to note that the developments in the Polish economy in the two years since the formal accession were influenced to a large extent by institutional and regulatory reforms undertaken in the years prior to the accession.
The transposition of EU legislation allowed Poland to profoundly reform the way in which its economy is regulated. Changes in such areas as financial markets, company law, accounting, and intellectual property rights have created better environment for business and have led to economic growth. The adoption of the European state aid regulations imposed restrictions on government intervention into the enterprise sector, while changes in competition law strengthened anti-monopolistic policies and the protection of consumers against the unfair behavior of producers.
In light of this, another important observation should be pointed out. Clearly, the gradual integration with other European countries has not been the only factor influencing the developments in the Polish economy. Governments of the member countries enjoy a large degree of freedom in planning and implementing domestic economic policies regulating their domestic business environments. Thus, when examining the economic developments, the impact of conventional economic factors should be taken into account as well. Finally, it should be mentioned that while the short-term shocks caused by the 2004 accession were already analyzed, the long term impact of EU membership can only be studied after several years.
a) Economic Growth
In the first two years of EU membership (2004) (2005) , Poland has enjoyed sound economic growth at an average rate of 4.2% a year (for yearly rates see 
b) Migrations
According to neo-classical economic theory (see Hicks, 1932) 22 However some of the employment registered in these three states soon after the enlargement was not a result of a new inflow of migrants but rather the legalization of workers from new member states who were already working in old member states. This may explain why local wages remained stable which was the opposite of the expectations of trade unions in recipient countries, which feared that workers from new member states will cause a fall in nominal wage growth in the UK and Ireland (Doyle et al, 2006) . Finally and contrary to expectations, it appears that migrants from CEE countries were attracted by labor opportunities and not by social welfare systems (World Bank, 2006a ).
All of the evidence points in favor of liberalizing labor markets in other old member countries that were reluctant to allow the free movement of labor from NMS at the outset. On the positive side of labor outflows: Poland benefits from increased remittances and expects to regain some of the labor with additional human capital. Yet remittances are mostly used to augment households' consumption and support tertiary education, so their impact on economic growth is very limited.
The evidence shows that the relatively high propensity for foreign migration is accompanied by low internal mobility. These two may be seen as alternatives (World Bank, 2006a) .
c) Trade
Trade with the EU member states was liberalized through the Europe Agreement signed in For many years Polish trade in goods grew at a faster pace than its' GDP (see Table 1 above), therefore the economy was slowly but consistently becoming more open. In the last year before the accession, i.e. in 2003, Polish exports grew by 14.2%. Such a high index was also registered for 2004 (see Table 1 Customs Code, but also that it has adopted the Common Customs Tariffs for the third countries. The latter caused a drop in an average tariff applied by the EU-10 on imports from the third countries from 8.9% to the EU average of 4.1%. This may explain the rapid increase in imports from developing countries (mainly from China), which is faster than from the EU.
However, exports to the third countries have also reached record growth levels (mainly to Russia and Ukraine). This increase of exports may be partly explained by export subsidies to trade in foodstuffs that also apply to Polish exports, as for all EU producers.
Polish farmers were afraid that after the accession, the Polish market would be flooded with imported food. This did not prove correct. On the contrary, the liberalization of trade in foodstuffs generated an increase in the Polish exports to the EU. The rapid growth of exports in recent years despite the low import demand from major markets may be explained to some extent by the growing presence of FDI in Poland.
Foreign-owned companies established in Poland account for a major part of Polish exports.
d) Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
FDI plays a crucial role in the process of a country's economic modernization. In the case of post-communist Poland and other CEE Countries, which were transforming their economic systems and restructuring their economies in the 1990s, there was a great need for foreign direct capital. FDI complemented the limited domestic sources of funding and created the potential for increases in production increases and the creation of employment. FDI inflows also contributed to productivity growth through the transfer of technology and expertise.
Additionally, FDI inflows had positive indirect effects (spillovers) as the presence of foreign direct multinationals improved the productivity of domestically-owned firms via technology transfers and enhanced competition.
At the beginning of the transition period, the FDI inflows to Poland were very low, for obvious reasons. They began to slowly increase in the mid-1990s when the market institutions were already in place. A considerable increase in the foreign direct investments to Poland was expected after the EU accession. These forecasts proved true as there was a spectacular increase in FDI inflows in the year of the accession: 2.5 times more than the previous year. Altogether EUR Lastly, it is worth noting that although they are still small, capital flows to Poland from the New Member States are increasing.
As far as the sectoral structure of the FDI stock in Poland is concerned, investments are concentrated in three sectors: manufacturing with 37% of the total foreign investment ranks 1st, financial intermediation 2nd (20%), and trade 3rd (18%) (NBP, 2006b ). In the manufacturing sector, the most attractive destinations for foreign capital were (1) motor vehicles manufacturing (EUR 4.7 million, 6.2%), and (2) food production (EUR 4.5 million, 6% of the total).
Interestingly, the Polish FDI, which for many years was very small and did not exceed EUR To receive more FDI in the future, Poland needs to substantially improve not only political, but also its business environment, so as to become more attractive to foreign investors.
Poland needs to stand out when competing with other investment destinations, which have made many improvements in regulation, tax systems etc. 28 According to the principle of n + 2, EU budget funds committed in the year n may be used only within the two years after year n. Unused funds are lost to the beneficiary and remain in the EU budget. This principle was introduced in the EU in 2000 in order to discipline recipient countries. A number of factors are to blame for the slow absorption of the structural funds (śuber, 2005) . The first one is that Poland has adopted a decentralized system of managing the structural programs. This prolongs the procedures, and requires more coordination. The second factor is the poor quality of the laws adopted in Poland that apply to the distribution and use of the structural funds. The third factor is the meager size of public funds for development projects (transport etc), which are necessary in order to co-finance infrastructural investments. The next reason is the poor quality of the system of public finances, which has not been reformed so far 
f) The Public Attitude towards Integration
Since the accession, public support for Poland's EU membership has been constantly increasing. In May 2004 supporters accounted for 71% of the adult population and opponents for 20%. By August 2006 the number of proponents increased by 11 percentage points to 83%, while the number of opponents was halved and shrank to 10% (CBOS, 2006b ). Only 7% had no opinion with regard to this matter. Supporters of Poland's membership to the EU dominated in all socio-demographic groups. The largest share of opponents was in the group of people with only primary education completed, yet they were not many of them (every sixth adult opposes integration). It is worth noticing that the massive support for integration was a characteristic for all the electorates of the main political parties, including those which, on the eve of Poland's accession, were openly against the membership. This result has been taken seriously into consideration by the anti-European politicians.
The results of the public polls also indicate that the supporters of Poland's membership evaluate the impact of the accession much more positively than the opponents, a majority of whom see more costs than benefits of EU integration (CBOS, 2006a) .
The number of people who positively assess the impact EU membership on Poland has been growing consistently over time. Two years after the integration, 54% of respondents believed that EU membership brought more benefits than costs for the country. This is 15
percentage points more than was indicated in polls taken after the first three months of the When asked about personal gains stemming from the country's membership in the EU, 36% declared that they benefited from the integration. 16% were of the opposite opinion and thought that they personally had lost rather than gained because of the Poland's integration into the Common Market
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.
The positive perception of the impact of Poland's integration both for the country and for the personal well-being of its citizens dominates in all socio-demographic groups. People who are younger, wealthier, have completed tertiary education, and are living in big cities are the groups that most often respond that the gains outweigh the hardships related to integration with the EU.
More importantly, the positive perception of the consequences of Poland's accession to the EU dominates across all electorates 33 from all the major political parties. In light of this widely held view, Polish parties that were openly anti-European in the pre-accession period, 31 18% of respondents believed that benefits and costs will be equal, while the remaining 10% responded "difficult to say". 32 28% believed that gains and costs outweighed each other, while very many (21%) could not answer ("do not know"), which is understandable. 33 Although the share of overall supporters differs to a greater extent. Interestingly, 45% of Poles 34 consistently believe that EU membership is more beneficial for old Member States than for Poland (percentage has remained constant since 1999). This is contrary to what the facts show. On average, the opposite opinion is more popular among the people who see net benefits of the integration for the country and themselves. 34 Out of those respondents who have an opinion on this issue, which is 82% of the population (12% answers: "do not know") (CBOS, 2006a) .
